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ABSTRACT
This paper attempts to resolve the apparent conflict between Descartes’ commitments 
to the creation doctrine and the necessity of eternal truths by elaborating different con-
ceptions of necessity in Descartes’ framework. More specifically, I argue that the fact that 
Descartes concedes the necessity of eternal truths does not compel him to assert the im-
possibility of their negation. Necessity, for Descartes, rather means immutability. Descartes 
distinguishes two kinds of immutable truths. While truths about God’s essence are abso-
lutely immutable, truths about the essences of God’s creation are conditionally immutable, 
i.e., they can change if God’s will changes. Since there are different kinds of eternal truths, 
they express different kinds of necessity as well, namely conditional and absolute necessity. 
After I clarify these two kinds of necessity, I explain how Descartes coherently maintains 
both that eternal truths are necessary and that God could have created eternal truths oth-
erwise without undermining their necessity.
Keywords: Descartes, eternal truths, the creation doctrine, necessity, immutability. 
RESUMO
Este artigo busca resolver o aparente conflito entre os compromissos de Descartes com a 
doutrina da criação e a necessidade das verdades eternas, elaborando diferentes concep-
ções de necessidade no quadro conceitual de Descartes. Mais especificamente, argumento 
que o fato de Descartes admitir a necessidade das verdades eternas não o obriga a afir-
mar a impossibilidade de sua negação. Necessidade, para Descartes, ao contrário, significa 
imutabilidade. Descartes distingue dois tipos de verdades imutáveis. Enquanto as verdades 
sobre a essência de Deus são absolutamente imutáveis, as verdades sobre as essências da 
criação de Deus são condicionalmente imutáveis, ou seja, elas podem mudar se a vontade 
de Deus muda. Uma vez que existem diferentes tipos de verdades eternas, eles também 
expressam diferentes tipos de necessidade, isto é, necessidade condicional e absoluta. 
Depois de esclarecer estes dois tipos de necessidade, eu explico como Descartes mantém 
coerentemente tanto que as verdades eternas são necessárias e que Deus poderia ter cria-
do verdades eternas de outra forma, sem prejudicar sua necessidade.
Palavras-chave: Descartes, verdades eternas, doutrina da criação, necessidade, imutabilidade.
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In the Meditations, Descartes seems to maintain the fol-
lowing theses2:
(1)  God created eternal truths freely just like He creat-
ed all other creatures. (The Creation Doctrine.)
(2)  God could have made it possible that eternal truths 
are false. (For instance, God could have made that 
2+2=4 is false.)
(3) Eternal truths are necessary.
There is an apparent incoherency between (1), (2), and 
(3). It seems that the necessity of eternal truths, which im-
plies a condition that could not have been otherwise, conflicts 
with Descartes’ conception of an omnipotent God who cre-
ates everything voluntarily. For instance, when we say that 
2+2=4 is necessarily true, we usually imply that it could not 
have been otherwise. Assuming that Descartes holds all of the 
theses above would be equivalent to saying that eternal truths, 
for Descartes, are both necessary and not necessary. One way 
to solve this apparent tension in Descartes’ account of eter-
nal truths involves denying one of the theses that lead to the 
conflict. While some scholars deny that Descartes holds the 
creation doctrine, others deny the necessity of eternal truths. 
The objective of this paper is to show that we can find two 
different kinds of necessity in Descartes’ writings allowing him 
to maintain all of the theses without a conflict. The structure 
of the paper will be as follows. First, I will show why the solu-
tions offered by some scholars, which involve getting rid of the 
incoherency by denying either the thesis that God could have 
created eternal truths otherwise or the creation doctrine, do 
not work. Then, I will argue that when Descartes asserts the 
necessity of eternal truths, he attributes them conditional neces-
sity, which should be understood in terms of the immutability 
that is conditional on the immutability of God’s will. 
The creation doctrine and the 
eternal truths
In his letter to Mersenne, 27 May 1630, Descartes explic-
itly argues for (1) that God freely created the eternal truths: 
You ask also what necessitated God to cre-
ate these truths; and I reply that he was free 
to make it not true that all radii of the circle 
are equal –just as free as he was not to cre-
ate the world. And it is certain that these 
truths are no more necessarily attached to 
his essence than are other created things. 
You ask what God did in order to produce 
them [eternal truths]. I reply that from all 
eternity he willed and understood them to 
be, and by that very fact he created them. 
Or, if you reserve the word created for the 
existence of things, then he established 
them [eternal truths] and made them [eter-
nal truths] (AT I 153, CSM III 25). 
According to Descartes, eternal truths – just as any oth-
er created things –depend on God’s will. They are no more 
necessarily attached to God’s essence. This is a consequence 
of God’s simple nature. Since God’s understanding is identical 
with His will – God’s understanding and will are only concep-
tually distinct and one is not prior to the other –, there can-
not be any standard that He understands prior to His willing 
and creation (AT I 153, CSM III 26). In other words, due to 
His simple nature God is not necessitated by any principles.3 
In other words, God understands, wills, and creates at the 
same time. Since God is free not to create the world at all or to 
create the world completely differently, He is also free not to 
make the eternal truths about the essence of His creation true. 
In other words, (1) that ‘God freely created eternal truths’ en-
tails (2) that ‘God could have created eternal truths otherwise’. 
However, given that the necessity of things requires that 
they could not have been otherwise, (2) that ‘eternal truths 
could have been created otherwise’ is in conflict with the thesis 
(3) that ‘eternal truths are necessary’. As a way of solving this 
incoherency some argue that Descartes does not argue for (2). 
According to Jonathan Bennett (1994), Descartes does not 
claim that eternal truths could have been otherwise. Bennett 
argues that Descartes merely refuses to assert that God could 
have created the eternal truths otherwise. He writes,
Indeed, did Descartes believe that God 
can do anything? He warns us against “ar-
rogantly supposing our minds to be so 
powerful and wise that we can attempt to 
grasp and set limits to what God can or 
should perform” [...]. Furthermore, if Des-
cartes thought that God is omnipotent, he 
was absurdly understating his position ev-
ery time he said that “God can bring about 
whatever we are clearly perceiving in a way 
exactly corresponding to our perception of 
it” (Bennett, 1994, p. 644).
To put it differently, for Bennett, Descartes cannot be 
arguing for the thesis (2) that ‘God could have created eter-
nal truths otherwise’ because it contradicts his view that God 
2 In this paper, I use the following abbreviations: AT: DESCARTES, R. 1996. Oevres de Descartes. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery (eds.). 
Paris, J. Vrin. Cited by volume and page number. CSM: DESCARTES, R. 1985. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vols. 1 & 2. John 
Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch (eds.). Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Cited by volume and page number. 
CSMK: DESCARTES, R. 1991. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. III. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, 
Anthony Kenny (eds.). Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Cited by page number. ST: AQUINAS, T. 1964-1981. Summa Theologi-
ae. Cambridge, Blackfriars.
3 For a detailed elaboration of this point see Walski (2003).
Saniye Vatansever
Filosofi a Unisinos – Unisinos Journal of Philosophy – 18(2):98-106, may/aug 2017 100
brings about things we clearly perceive and we cannot grasp 
how eternal truths could have been false. Bennett claims that 
rather than making a positive assertion about God’s doings, 
Descartes merely advises us to su end our judgments on 
God’s capacities. Moreover, for Bennett, we should consider 
Descartes’ claims about the modal status of eternal truths as 
assertions regarding the limits of our understanding in terms 
of their conceivability or inconceivability (Bennett, 1994, 
p. 656). Asserting that God could have made eternal truths 
false, for Bennett, means that we can make sense of some-
thing of which we cannot make sense (Bennett, 1994, p. 658). 
The most powerful textual support for Bennett’s interpreta-
tion comes from Descartes’ letter to Arnould on 29 July 1648, 
where Descartes writes,
I do not think that we should ever say of 
anything that it cannot be brought about 
by God. For since every basis of truth and 
goodness depends on his omnipotence, 
I would not dare to say that God cannot 
make a mountain without a valley, or that 
one and two should not be three. I merely 
say that he has given me such a mind that 
I cannot conceive a mountain without a val-
ley, or an aggregate of one and two which 
is not three, and that such things involve a 
contradiction in my conception (AT V 435; 
CSM III 358).
Here, Descartes argues both that we should not dare to say 
that God could not have made contradictories possible and that 
the negations of eternal truths are contradictions in our con-
ception. This passage clearly supports Bennett’s interpretation 
according to which Descartes does not explicitly argue for (2) 
because Cartesian modality should be understood through 
conceptual analysis as opposed to by appealing to God’s re-
lation to eternal truths. However, there are a couple of other 
places where Descartes makes positive assertions regarding 
our knowledge that God could have made eternal truths false. 
For instance, in his letter to Mesland, 2 May 1644 Descartes 
argues that God’s omnipotence entails (2). He writes,
I turn to the difficulty of conceiving how God 
would have been acting freely and indiffer-
ently if he had made it false that the three 
angles of a triangle were equal to two right 
angles, or in general that contradictories 
could not be true. It is easy to dispel this dif-
ficulty by considering that the power of God 
cannot have any limits. [...] [This] shows us 
that God cannot have been determined to 
make it true that contradictories cannot be 
true together, and therefore he could have 
done the opposite (AT IV 118; CSM III 235).
Here, Descartes explicitly asserts that God could have 
made eternal truths otherwise.4 Similarly in his letter to 
Mersenne, Descartes writes that, “You ask also what ne-
cessitated God to create these truths; and I reply that he 
was free to make it not true that all the radii of the circle 
are equal – just as free as he was not to create the world” 
(AT I 152; CSM III 25). It seems that textual evidence is 
too compelling to disregard them as merely confused or 
unfortunate assertions on Descartes’ part. 
Although Bennett’s interpretation correctly points out 
Descartes’ frequent references to the finitude of our under-
standing and our lack of grasp of the divine omnipotence, 
his interpretation presupposes that in order to know that 
God could have made eternal truths otherwise, we should 
understand or grasp those contradictions. However, as Des-
cartes puts it, there is no reason why we should understand 
the negations of each individual eternal truth in order to 
know that creating such negations is in God’s power:
Again, there is no need to ask how God 
could have brought it about from eterni-
ty that it was not true that twice four make 
eight, and so on; for I admit this is unintelligi-
ble for us. Yet on the other hand I do under-
stand, quite correctly, that there cannot be 
any class of entity that does not depend on 
God; I also understand that it would have 
been easy for God to ordain certain things 
such that we men cannot understand the 
possibility of their being otherwise than 
they are. And therefore it would be irratio-
nal for us to doubt what we do understand 
correctly just because there is something 
which we do not understand and which, so 
far as we can see, there is no reason why 
we should understand (AT VII 436; CSM II 
294, emphasis mine).
In other words, Descartes argues that the question, 
‘How God could have made contradictories possible?’ is the 
wrong question because it presupposes that we should 
understand/ grasp how it is possible. It seems that Descartes 
does not think that we need to grasp or understand how 
eternal truths could have been false in order to know that 
God could have created eternal truths otherwise. 
Descartes is careful to distinguish the epistemic state of 
grasping how from knowing that. He argues that we may know 
that certain things are the case even though we may not un-
derstand or grasp how they are actually possible. For example, 
in his letter to Mersenne, 27 May 1630, he argues as follows:
For it is certain that he [God] is the author 
of the essence of created things no less 
4 Bennett admits that this fragment of Descartes’ letter to Mesland contradicts his interpretation. However, he considers the passage to 
be controversial and does not take it to be a serious problem for his interpretation. In fact, Bennett calls this letter “hot potato letter” 
and suggests that this is an unfortunate writing on Descartes part (Bennett, 1994, p. 657).
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than of their existence; and this essence is 
nothing other than eternal truths. I do not 
conceive them as emanating from God like 
rays from the sun; but I know that God is the 
author of everything and that these truths 
are something and consequently that he 
is their author, I say that I know this, not 
that I conceive it or grasp it; because it is 
possible to know that God is infinite and 
all powerful although our soul, being fi-
nite, cannot grasp or conceive him. [...] To 
grasp something is to embrace it in one’s 
thought; to know something, it is suffi-
cient to touch it with one’s thought (AT I 
152, CSM III 25, emphasis mine).
In other words, even though we cannot grasp or conceive 
how powerful God really is and how He is the author of the 
eternal truths, we can nonetheless know that He is omnipo-
tent and that He created the eternal truths just as He creat-
ed other things. Accordingly, although we cannot grasp how 
contradictories, i.e., logical, physical, geometrical and meta-
physical impossibilities, could have been possible, we can 
nonetheless know that God could have made them possible. 
It seems, therefore, that Bennett’s interpretation overlooks 
this significant distinction that Descartes makes between 
grasping how something is the case and knowing that something 
is the case. Hence, the answer to the question whether we can 
assert that God could have created eternal truths otherwise 
lies in noticing this distinction as it allows Descartes to de-
marcate the issues on which we can make positive judgments 
from the ones on which we should su end judgment. Since 
Bennett ignores the significance of this distinction, he attri-
butes a rather conservative position to Descartes, according 
to which we should and cannot make any positive assertions 
about the free creation of eternal truths. 
So far, I have argued that Descartes maintains (1) that 
‘God freely created the eternal truths’ and that (1) entails (2) 
‘eternal truths could have been otherwise’. Hence, we cannot 
resolve the initial incoherence in Descartes’ commitments 
about eternal truths by rejecting either (1) or (2) as the textu-
al evidence is strong enough to hold that Descartes holds (1) 
and consequently (2). Some argue that if Descartes wants to 
have a coherent view he has to abandon (3) i.e., ‘eternal truths 
are necessary’ because necessity implies that eternal truths 
could not have been otherwise. Next, I will examine whether 
Descartes maintains that eternal truths are in fact necessary 
and what Descartes means by necessity.
Necessity of eternal truths
Harry Frankfurt agrees that, for Descartes, God could 
have created eternal truths otherwise. Yet, he denies that 
eternal truths, for Descartes, are inherently necessary.5 
According to Frankfurt, Cartesian eternal truths are ‘inher-
ently contingent’ because God could have created them oth-
erwise and could have made them false (Frankfurt, 1977, p. 
42). He argues further that the necessity that is attached to 
eternal truths derives from the constitution of our minds.
The propositions we find to be necessary 
– like the Pythagorean theorem – need not 
be truths at all. The inconceivability of their 
falsity, which we demonstrate by the use of 
innate principles of reason, is not inherent 
in them. It is properly to be understood only 
as relative to the character of our minds 
(Frankfurt, 1977, p. 45).
In other words, as a way of solving the apparent inco-
herency in Descartes’ views on the creation doctrine and 
eternal truths, Frankfurt simply denies that eternal truths are 
necessary. On his account, the necessity of eternal truths is 
nothing but the necessity of human mind, to which we can-
not help but assent (Frankfurt, 1977, p. 57). Hence, according 
to Frankfurt, eternal truths appear to be necessary, but there is 
in fact nothing ‘intrinsically necessary’ about them. 
The problem with this interpretation, as Frankfurt him-
self admits, is that if there are no truly necessary propositions, 
it means that necessary propositions even about God’s nature 
are merely apparently necessary or necessary from out point 
of view. Thus, it might be the case that God is a deceiver, de-
spite the fact that we cannot conceive of such a possibility. 
As Frankfurt puts it,
But the proposition that God is a deceiver, 
however offensive to human reason it may 
be, cannot be regarded by Descartes as any 
more an absolute impossibility than the prop-
ositions – which on his account are equally 
unintelligible – that God can create a wholly 
void space or that He can create an atom He 
cannot divide (Frankfurt, 1977, p. 52). 
Since all necessities are just necessities of our own con-
tingent nature, it follows that from a logical point of view 
everything is possible. Hence, even the contradictory claims 
regarding the nature of God, which Descartes relies on in his 
argument for the existence of the external world, are possibly 
false for there is no guarantee that the proposition that God is 
not a deceiver corresponds to reality. And if it is possible that 
God is a deceiver, then we have no guarantee that any of our 
truth claims, even the ones that seem necessary to us, are in 
fact true.
Similarly, according to Frankfurt, in the Cartesian sys-
tem science is impossible as well. For science is construed as 
5 Margaret Wilson argues in a similar line. She argues that “Descartes did regard the ‘necessity’ we perceive in mathematical propo-
sitions as in some sense and degree a function of the constitution of our minds--themselves finite ‘creatures’” (Wilson, 1978, p. 125).
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an attempt to discover the objective truth about the world 
beyond the limitations of our cognitive powers (Frankfurt, 
1977, p. 54). If Frankfurt’s interpretation is true, it also means 
that Descartes’ whole project in the Meditations is in danger 
because Descartes relies on the ‘truth rule’, according to which 
whatever we clearly and distinctly perceive is true.6 
Fortunately, Frankfurt’s interpretation is not the only 
way to get us out of the initial problem. That is, we do not 
have to deny the necessity of eternal truths in order to read 
Descartes’ account of eternal truths consistently with the 
Creation Doctrine. Besides, his reading has little textual sup-
port. In fact, Descartes explicitly asserts in several passag-
es that eternal truths are independent of the nature of our 
minds. For instance, in the fifth meditation, while he talks 
about the necessity of geometrical truths and the necessary 
existence of God, he argues that their necessity is indepen-
dent of our minds:
When, for example, I imagine a triangle, even 
if perhaps no such figure exists, or has ever 
existed, anywhere outside my thought, there 
is still a determinate nature, or essence, or 
form of the triangle which is immutable and 
eternal, and not invented by me or depen-
dent on my mind (AT VII 64; CSM II 45).
 
It is not that my thought makes it so [that ex-
istence and God is inseparable], or imposes 
any necessity on anything; on the contrary, 
it is the necessity of the thing itself, namely 
the existence of God, which determines my 
thinking in this respect (AT VII 67; CSM II 46).
As is clear in these passages, contra what Frankfurt sug-
gests the necessity of our thoughts, according to Descartes, 
does not derive from the nature of our minds. On the con-
trary, since these necessities are real and independent, God 
guarantees that our thinking corresponds to those necessary 
truths. As Descartes asserts, “First, I know that everything 
which I clearly and distinctly understand is capable of be-
ing created by God so as to correspond exactly with my un-
derstanding of it” (AT VII 78; CSM II 54, emphasis mine). 
Therefore, if I clearly and distinctly perceive something is the 
case, then I can infer that it is the case because an all-good 
God would ensure that our understanding corresponds to the 
reality (AT VII 70; CSM II 48). 
I hope it is now clear that if Descartes had Frankfurt’s 
conception of necessity in mind, he could never e ablish the 
“truth rule”, which plays a central role in Descartes’ philosophy 
in general for it enables him to achieve certain knowledge of 
countless matters whose nature is intellectual and also corpo-
real (AT VII 71; CSM II 49). The identification of necessity 
with our subjective convictions can at most ensure us that we 
will never be aware of our particular errors (AT VIIIA 21; 
CSM I 207). In brief, Frankfurt’s mind-dependent necessity 
cannot be what Descartes had in mind.7 
It seems that the common problem with the attempts 
to eliminate the apparent incoherency in Descartes’ views on 
the creation doctrine and eternal truths lies in the unjustified 
assumption that Descartes has to abandon one of the theses. 
While for Bennett Descartes denies the theses (1) that ‘God 
created eternal truths freely just like He created all other 
creatures’ and consequently (2) that ‘God could have made 
it possible that eternal truths are false’, for Frankfurt he denies 
the thesis (3) that ‘eternal truths are necessary’. As I have ar-
gued, neither Bennett nor Frankfurt’s accounts are satisfacto-
ry. In the next and final section of this paper, I will argue that 
in order to eliminate the inconsistency we need to explore 
Descartes’ conception of necessity. As will be clear, by neces-
sity Descartes simply means immutability of eternal truths, 
which are dependent on the immutability of God’s will. 
Descartes’ conception of 
necessity: Absolute and 
conditional necessities 
Although simple and appealing, the contemporary no-
tion of necessity understood as ‘a condition that could not 
have been otherwise’ does not fit well into Descartes philos-
ophy. He argues that eternal truths are necessary, and yet he 
also maintains that they could have been created otherwise. 
I will argue that the source of incoherency lies in our mis-
conception of the Cartesian necessity rather than his com-
mitments to the creation doctrine or the necessity of eter-
nal truths.8 In order to understand Descartes’ conception of 
6 As E.M. Curley points out, Frankfurt’s interpretation both undermines Descartes’ ontological argument, which presupposes the ex-
istence of true and immutable essence of things and it conflicts with Descartes’ a priori method in physics. For a detailed defense of 
these points see Curley (1984, p. 570-576).
7 As an alternative to Frankfurt’s mind-dependent-necessity, Peter Geach proposes a world-dependent conception of necessity, accord-
ing to which “the eternal truths are necessary in our world, and in giving us our mental endowments God gave us the right sort of clear 
and distinct ideas to see the necessity.”’ Geach argues that even though eternal truths are necessary, they are not necessarily necessary; 
God could have freely chosen to make a different sort of world, in which other things would have been necessary truths (Geach, 1973, 
p. 10). However, this view is also in conflict with Descartes’ views in the Principles where he argues that even if God created many worlds, 
there could not be any in which they failed to be observed (AT VI 43; CSM I 132; AT XI 47; CSM I).
8 Dan Kaufman (2005) also argues the necessity of eternal truths is compatible with God’s omnipotence to create eternal truths other-
wise. However, his account is based on the assumption that God simply did not will to create all other possibilities of contradictions. 
However, his view does not help us much because he assumes that possibilities are prior to God’s creation of them, which contradicts 
the singularity and the unity of God’s will, understanding, and creation.
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necessity we should first examine its scholastic roots, more 
 ecifically we should analyze Thomas Aquinas’ account 
of necessity by supposition, which I call conditional necessity. 
In this section, I will argue that, following Aquinas, Descartes 
assumes that there are two kinds of necessity, namely condi-
tional and absolute necessity.
According to Aquinas, “there are two ways in which a 
thing can be necessary, namely, absolutely necessary, and neces-
sary by supposition (ST I, 110). He argues that while God’s will-
ing things in Himself, such as His goodness and omnipotence 
etc., is absolute necessity, His willing things apart from Himself 
is necessity by supposition (ST I, 111). Hence, in order to de-
termine whether eternal truths, i.e., truths about the essences 
of things, are absolutely necessary or necessary by supposition for 
Aquinas, we need to determine which truths are in God and 
which ones are apart from Him. For Aquinas, not only truths 
about God’s essence, but also all eternal truths about God’s 
creation reside in God’s mind. As he states, “the nature of a 
circle, and the fact that two and three makes five, have eter-
nity in the mind of God” (ST I, 99). Hence, eternal truths are 
absolutely necessary just as truths about God’s own essence. 
On the other hand, Aquinas argues that certain truths 
such as “Socrates is sitting” are necessary by supposition. In other 
words, such truths according to Aquinas are simply condition-
ally necessary because God wills them to be the case, that e.g. 
“Socrates is sitting” and that it should not be absolute necessity. 
Moreover, God’s will does not change, therefore, even though 
“Socrates is sitting” is not an absolute necessity, it is condition-
al on the fact that God has willed it to be the case. 
Having made the distinction between absolute and 
conditional necessities, it seems that Descartes also has a 
similar distinction in mind. According to the creation doc-
trine, God freely created everything including the eternal 
truths and everything depends on Him.9 By eternal truths 
Descartes means the essences of created things (AT I 151-2; 
CSM III 25). According to Descartes, truths of mathemat-
ics, geometry, and truths of metaphysics and ethics are eter-
nal truths.10 He argues further that “the existence of God is 
the first and most eternal of all possible truths and the one 
from which alone others proceed” (AT I 150; CSM III 24). 
In other words, Descartes distinguishes eternal truths from 
the truths about God’s existence (and essence), which are 
the first and most eternal truths of all.11 He argues that we 
cannot even conceive of the impossibility of truths about 
God’s essence and existence. He writes, “I agree that there 
are contradictions which are so evident that we cannot 
put them before our minds without judging them entirely 
impossible, like the one you suggest: ‘that God might have 
brought it about that his creatures were independent of 
him’” (AT IV 119, CSM III 235). It is clear from this passage 
that Descartes wants to prevent us from making contradic-
tory inferences about God’s essence. Thus, he distinguishes 
truths about God’s essence and existence from other eter-
nal truths. That is why in presenting his position on eternal 
truths he mostly  eaks of mathematical and physical truths 
as dependent on God’s will and not of truths about God’s 
essence. In this re ect, when Descartes talks about eternal 
truths we should generally understand truths about the es-
sences of created things only.12
This might seem as an arbitrary limitation of eternal 
truths.13 Nevertheless, the exclusion of truths regarding the 
essence and existence of God from the scope of eternal truths 
enables Descartes to hold (2) without a contradiction to (1) 
and (3). Descartes’ commitment to the thesis (2) that ‘God 
could have made eternal truths false’ compels him to consider 
the first and most eternal of all truths as distinct and separate 
from the rest of eternal truths. If truths about God’s essence 
and existence were eternal, then Descartes has to argue that 
God could have made His essence and existence otherwise 
as well.14 Yet, for Descartes, God exists necessarily and His 
essence is necessarily as it is. In other words, God’s essence 
could not have been otherwise. So, by demarcating the truths 
about the essence or existence of God from the eternal truths 
about the essence of created things, Descartes consistently ar-
gues that the latter could have been created otherwise. I will 
call the truths regarding the existence and essence of God ab-
9 Here I adopt Margaret Wilson’s term ‘creation doctrine’ (see Wilson, 1978). While Wilson thinks that the creation doctrine is simply the 
view that everything that exists depends on God’s will, I use this doctrine in a more narrow sense to signify that all eternal truths depend 
on God’s will. The reason for this qualification is that, as I will argue, the essential attributes of God do not depend on God’s will in the 
way that the essential features of other things, i.e., eternal truths depend on it. While God freely determines the essence of everything 
else, His own nature is not freely determined by His will. He exists absolutely necessarily while everything else exists simply because God 
willed them to exist, hence their existence is merely conditionally necessary.
10 Some instances of the metaphysical eternal truths are: Nothing comes from nothing; It is impossible for the same thing to be and not 
to be at the same time; What is done cannot be undone; He who thinks cannot but exist while he thinks, etc. (AT VIIIA 24; CSM I 209).
11 Note that God’s essence and existence are identical and they are only conceptually distinct.
12 Paul Sperring distinguishes what he calls “god facts” and “other facts”, and argues that the necessary truths pertaining to God’s 
nature are of a higher order of necessity than the rest of the eternal truths. Yet, he does not present an account of the scholastic source 
of this distinction. Nor does he explain why the former has a higher modal status. For his account of the distinction in question, see 
Sperring (2005).
13 According to Margaret Wilson, exclusion of truths about God’s essence and existence form eternal truths is an arbitrary limitation. 
As she writes, “even if Descartes did want to limit his doctrine to the eternal truths of mathematics and physics, it is not clear how the 
limitation could be other than arbitrary and ad hoc” (Wilson, 1978, p. 124).
14 Walski (2003) falsely assumes that Descartes takes truths about God’s essence and existence to be instances of eternal truths and 
unjustifiably concludes that Descartes’ views on the creation doctrine and eternal truths are incoherent.
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solute necessities for they are not only eternal but, unlike other 
eternal truths, could not have been otherwise.15
Descartes distinguishes truths about God’s essence from 
other eternal truths, i.e., truths about the essences of creat-
ed things. The negation of truths about God’s essence is en-
tirely impossible. In this regard, Descartes demarcates absolute 
necessities that could not have been created otherwise from 
conditional necessities, whose negation could have been true, 
but that God chose them to be true. Truths regarding God’s 
nature such as “God is omnipotent” and “God is simple” are 
absolute necessities or, as some may want to put it, they are 
necessarily necessary (see Curley, 1984). 
However, unlike Aquinas, for Descartes eternal truths 
do not reside in God’s mind. According to Descartes, eternal 
truths, just as other created things, are apart from God. In his 
letter to Mersenne, 7 May 1630, Descartes argues that it is 
certain that eternal truths are no more necessarily attached to 
God’s essence than are other created things (AT I 152; CSM 
III 25). This is again a consequence of God’s simple nature. 
Hence, contrary to Aquinas, for Descartes eternal truths, 
such as “2+2=4” and “Men are mortal”, are not absolutely nec-
essary, they are merely conditional necessities. 
 By conditional necessity, what is meant is that the necessi-
ty of eternal truths is conditional on God’s will and its immu-
tability. Supposing that God willed them to be necessary, they 
are necessary. As Aquinas puts it, “from the very fact that 
nothing resists the divine will, it follows that not only those 
things happen that God wills to happen, but that they happen 
necessarily or contingently according to God’s will” (ST I, 116, em-
phasis mine). Descartes argues in quite a similar manner and 
writes that “[truths] are immutable and eternal, since the will 
and decree of God willed and decreed that they should be so. 
Whether you think this is hard or easy to accept, it is enough 
for me that it is true” (AT I 380; CSM II. 261). He also gives 
the following examples:
For example, God did not will the creation 
of the world in time because he saw that 
it would be better this way than if he had 
created it from eternity; nor did he will 
that the three angles or a triangle should 
be equal to two right angles because he 
recognized that it could not be otherwise, 
and so on. On the contrary, it is because 
he willed to create the world in time that 
it is better this way than if he had created 
it from eternity; and it is because he willed 
that the three angles of a triangle should 
necessarily be equal to two right angles 
that this is true and cannot be otherwise; 
and so on in other cases (AT VII 432; CSM II 
291, emphasis mine).
In other words, both Aquinas and Descartes hold that 
God made certain things necessary and certain things contin-
gent. In this re ect, they both assume that necessity of truths 
is compatible with God’s will and the creation doctrine. More-
over, Aquinas writes that, “although God’s willing a thing is 
not by absolute necessity, yet it is necessary by supposition, 
on account of the unchangeableness of the divine will” (ST 
I, 115). That is, conditional necessities are dependent on the 
immutability of God’s will. Hence, unless God’s will changes, 
they do not change either. In his letter to Mersenne, 15 April 
1630, Descartes makes this point most clearly:
It will be said that if God had established 
these truths he could change them as a king 
changes his laws. To this the answer is: Yes 
he can, if his will can change. “But I under-
stand them [these eternal truths] to be eter-
nal and unchangeable”. I make the same 
judgment about God (AT I 146; CSM III 23).
Notice that Descartes’ attitude towards the changeabili-
ty of eternal truths is quite conservative in comparison to his 
views regarding the free creation of eternal truths. He argues 
that eternal truths cannot change because their change implies 
change in God’s will, which is inconceivable.16 This in turn 
indicates that the immutability of eternal truths is essential 
for their being eternal and necessary.17
Another indication of Descartes’ resistance to making 
any assertion regarding the immutability of eternal truths 
is the language he uses when referring to the eternal truths. 
While he argues that God could have created them oth-
erwise, he never asserts that God can change them. This 
might be falsely interpreted as if he could chose another 
set of eternal truths to be true, which presupposes the ex-
istence of many sets of truths waiting for God to choose 
them. Yet, such reading would conflict with Descartes’ 
commitment to the unity of God’s understanding and will. 
That is, God could not have first understood different sets 
of truths and then willed to create one set among many. 
Thus, when Descartes argues that God could have made 
eternal truths otherwise we should read him simply as ar-
guing that God could have created different things with 
different essential properties that would be expressed with 
a different set of eternal truths. The fact that God freely 
15 For structural purposes, I will leave the discussion about absolute necessities for the final part of the paper, where I will compare and 
contrast them to the eternal truths about created things, which, as I will argue, are conditional necessities.
16 In the Conversation with Burman, Descartes repeats the point about the immutability of God’s attributes. As he writes, “Concerning 
the decrees of God which have already been enacted, it is clear that God is immutable with respect to these, and from the metaphysical 
point of view it is impossible to conceive the matter otherwise” (AT V 166; CSMK 348).
17 I agree with Curley’s immutability interpretation of necessity, according to which the necessity of eternal truths derives from the im-
mutability of God’s will (1984, p. 588).
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chose what to create does not undermine the necessity of 
eternal truths because once they are created, their necessity 
is guaranteed by their immutability.
When Descartes argues that eternal truths are neces-
sary, therefore, he simply means that they are true at all times 
and their truth-value cannot change unless God’s will chang-
es. The argument for the necessity of eternal truths can be 
stated more formally as follows:
(1)  God freely creates and determines the eternal 
truths, i.e., the essence of things.
(2)  Once created, the essence of His creation does not 
change, unless God’s will changes.
(3) God’s will is immutable.
(4)  Eternal truths are immutable. (E.g., 2+2=4 is always 
true.)
(5) Immutability entails necessity.
(6) Eternal truths are necessary.
Having defined the necessity of eternal truths as the 
immutability of truths that depend on God’s immutable 
will, one might worry that such an account does not leave 
any room for contingent truths. In “God’s Immutability and 
the Necessity of Descartes’s Eternal Truths”, Dan Kaufman 
criticizes the immutability interpretation. According to 
Kaufman, the immutability interpretation is incorrect be-
cause it is either too weak to explain the necessity of the 
eternal truths or it is too strong in that it would commit 
Descartes to strong necessitarianism, a view that does not 
have any room for contingent truths.18 
While Kaufman is right to demand an explicit explana-
tion of how immutability accounts for the necessity of eternal 
truths, I think that his worry can be addressed just by defining 
necessity in terms of immutability and contingency in terms 
of mutability. While the essence of his creation cannot change 
unless God’s nature changes, the accidental properties of ob-
jects can change under various different conditions. One pos-
sible explanation for this is that while God wills the essential 
properties of things to be in a particular way, he merely sets 
limits for the accidental properties but does not decide upon 
how the accidental properties should be. That is, the acciden-
tal properties of objects are not sufficiently determined by 
the essential properties of things. In that re ect, while acci-
dental features of God’s creation are still dependent on God’s 
will, they are not willed in the same way that eternal truths 
are willed, i.e., they are not willed to be in a particular way. 
Hence, even if all truths including the contingent truths are 
effects of God’s immutable will, this does not mean that they 
cannot change. Contingent facts, like I have a body or short 
hair, can change in time. 
Contra what Kaufman argues, in order to account 
for the immutability of eternal truths, one does not need 
to adopt the Transfer of Immutability Principle, according 
to which eternal truths are immutable because they are the 
creation of God’s immutable will. While Kaufman is right to 
point out that this principle leads to strong necessitarianism 
according to which all truths are necessary, he is wrong to 
think that in order for the immutability interpretation to 
work it needs to appeal to this principle. Immutability of 
the eternal truths does not directly derive from the fact that 
they are the products of God’s immutable will. Their im-
mutability rather derives from the fact that God freely wills 
them to be immutable. The fact that contingent facts also 
depend on God’s immutable will, therefore, does not mean 
that they should be immutable and necessary. God does not 
will contingent facts to be immutable. While both contin-
gent and necessary truths are created by God’s immutable 
will, God wills them differently, i.e., He wills them to be mu-
table or immutable re ectively. 
By defining necessity in terms of immutability and 
contingency in terms of changeability of the truth-value 
of statements, one can therefore explain how Descartes 
can consistently hold that eternal truths are necessary 
even though God could have created them otherwise. Un-
derstanding necessity as immutability would also help us 
distinguish different kinds of eternal truths. It seems that 
Descartes allows for a hierarchy between different kinds of 
eternal truths when he asserts that the existence of God is 
the most eternal of all truths. Following Paul Sperring, we 
should distinguish eternal truths pertaining to God’s nature 
from the eternal truths pertaining to the essential features of 
God’s creation. While the former are “absolutely necessary” 
simply because God’s nature would not change and there-
fore those truths about God cannot change, the latter kinds 
of eternal truths are only “conditionally necessary” because 
their truth-value is conditional upon the mutability of God’s 
will. Even if both kinds of truths are necessary and thereby 
immutable, while the eternal truths about God could not 
have been otherwise, we can entertain the thought that the 
latter kind of immutable truths could be otherwise due to 
the fact that they are the product of God’s free will. Simi-
larly, while the negation of absolute necessities, such as “God 
is omnipotent,” is an absolute impossibility, the negation of 
conditional necessities, such as “2+2=4,” is a conditional im-
possibility because it is conditional on the immutability of 
God’s will. 
Hence, while Aquinas and Descartes disagree on the 
modal status of eternal truths they both argue that the neces-
sity of things that are apart from God is determined by God’s 
free will and that their necessity depends on God’s immutable 
will. Given these pieces of evidence, it seems that by the ne-
cessity of eternal truths they merely mean the immutability 
of those truths. In his reply to Gassendi, Descartes explains 
how it is possible that truths of geometry and metaphysics are 
both immutable and eternal and yet dependent on God and 
18 For a detailed account of his critique of the immutability interpretation and his own solution to the original problem, see Kaufman 
(2005).
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argues that since eternal truths are always the same we can 
call them eternal.19 Hence, according to Descartes we are jus-
tified to call the eternal truths ‘necessary’ and ‘eternal’ not be-
cause they are independent of God, but simply because they 
do not change. He argues that eternal truths “follow manifest-
ly from the mere fact that God is immutable and that, a ing 
always in the same way, he always produces the same effect” 
(AT XI 43; CSM I 96).
Concluding remarks
In this paper, I argued against two influential interpre-
tations of Descartes’ view regarding the modality of eternal 
truths and the creation doctrine by undermining the com-
mon underlying assumption in both views, namely that the 
necessity of eternal truths entails that they could not have 
been created otherwise. If by claiming that eternal truths are 
necessary Descartes meant that they could not have been 
created otherwise, he would contradict himself, as there are 
many passages suggesting otherwise. Similarly, there is also 
textual evidence showing that he also assumes the necessity 
of eternal truths. Hence, the solutions offered to resolve the 
problem consist of denying either one of the theses (1) that 
‘God created eternal truths freely just like he created all other 
creatures’, (2) that ‘God could have made it possible that eter-
nal truths are false’ or (3) ‘Eternal truths are necessary.’ 
As I have argued, the necessity of eternal truths should 
be understood as the immutability of those truths. Thus, 
when Descartes claims that eternal truths are necessary he 
rather emphasizes their immutability instead of claiming 
that they could not have been otherwise. I also argued that 
the necessity of eternal truths is similar to the Thomistic con-
ditional necessity, according to which necessity is conditional, 
i.e., they are immutable as long as God’s will is immutable. In 
this re ect, the immutability, i.e. necessity, of eternal truths is 
guaranteed by the immutability of God’s nature. Accordingly, 
contingency can be understood as mutability. This interpre-
tation does not only solve the apparent inconsistency but also 
explains the following, (i) how God could freely determine 
which propositions should be necessary, i.e. unchangeable, 
and which ones should be contingent, i.e. changing in time; 
(ii) how God’s unified nature could have created different 
sets of necessary, i.e. unchangeable, truths; (iii) how Cartesian 
necessity as immutability is compatible with divine omnipo-
tence; and finally (iv) how Descartes avoids making assertions 
regarding the changeability of eternal truths while he confi-
dently argues that God could have created them otherwise. 
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